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Implementation of clinical research trials
using web-based and mobile devices:
challenges and solutions
Roy Eagleson1, Luis Altamirano-Diaz2,3,4, Alex McInnis2, Eva Welisch2,3,4, Stefanie De Jesus5, Harry Prapavessis5,
Meghan Rombeek2, Jamie A. Seabrook3,6, Teresa Park2 and Kambiz Norozi2,3,4,7,8,9*

Abstract
Background: With the increasing implementation of web-based, mobile health interventions in clinical trials, it is
crucial for researchers to address the security and privacy concerns of patient information according to high ethical
standards. The full process of meeting these standards is often made more complicated due to the use of internetbased technology and smartphones for treatment, telecommunication, and data collection; however, this process is
not well-documented in the literature.
Results: The Smart Heart Trial is a single-arm feasibility study that is currently assessing the effects of a web-based,
mobile lifestyle intervention for overweight and obese children and youth with congenital heart disease in
Southwestern Ontario. Participants receive telephone counseling regarding nutrition and fitness; and complete
goal-setting activities on a web-based application. This paper provides a detailed overview of the challenges the
study faced in meeting the high standards of our Research Ethics Board, specifically regarding patient privacy.
Conclusion: We outline our solutions, successes, limitations, and lessons learned to inform future similar studies;
and model much needed transparency in ensuring high quality security and protection of patient privacy when
using web-based and mobile devices for telecommunication and data collection in clinical research.
Keywords: Web-based technology, e-health, Privacy, Security, Obesity, Paediatric cardiology

Background
The use of web-based applications and smartphones is
becoming more prevalent in healthcare and clinical research settings. The various uses of internet and mobile
technology include: health information systems in hospitals; outpatient monitoring, such as wearable telemetry
systems (Body Scan Networks) that measure physiological changes in patients with chronic illnesses [1, 2];
telecommunication between patients and healthcare professionals, such as tele-counselling and text reminders
for mental health patients [3–5]; and data management
systems for clinical research studies [6]. There are many
benefits of web-based and mobile technologies, including
continuous monitoring for chronically ill patients, better
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quality care and feedback, reduced hospitalization time,
increased medical capacity, and reduced medical cost
[1, 2, 7]. However, amidst the rapid spread and progression of technology in healthcare, we must uphold high
ethical standards for protecting patient privacy. Kotz et
al. cautions that designers and developers of healthcare
information technologies must address security challenges; otherwise, the benefits for healthcare information technology (IT) will be elusive [8]. The very nature
of the internet introduces security and privacy issues,
including potential privacy breaches through hacking
and data corruption during transfer [9]. A review by
Seko et al. revealed that ensuring confidentiality and privacy
was the most commonly stated concern in published
studies regarding mobile mental health interventions
for adolescents [3].
Despite the ever-present security concerns, the process of
addressing these concerns, especially in the development
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and implementation of web-based, mobile health interventions, is not well-documented and fragmented in literature.
Literature is fragmented in terms of techniques and
schemes that are used, such as data encryption, anonymization, and pseudonymization techniques. Also, few studies
report the entire process of gaining ethics approval regarding patient privacy or how different frameworks
and techniques are used specifically in clinical research
to develop and implement a web-based mobile intervention. Clinical research studies implementing webbased mobile health interventions do not often discuss
data security in detail. Those that do report security
measures for collected data most commonly report
having secure servers/institution firewalls, username/
password authentication, 128-bit data encryption, and
de-identification of personal information. Each intervention is unique, with different methods for interacting with participants and requiring tailored safeguards
for protecting patient privacy. Without a standardized
procedure for implementing web-based and mobile
systems in clinical research, it is important to demonstrate transparency regarding security and protection of
patient privacy when conducting such studies. This is not
only to inform other researchers, but to demonstrate ethical
duty to privacy.

The “Smart Heart” Trial
The Smart Heart Trial is an ongoing single arm feasibility
study to examine how a 12-month lifestyle intervention
will impact health and well-being measures, such as body
weight and body composition, in overweight and obese
children and adolescents with congenital heart disease
(CHD) in Southwestern Ontario. All participants are provided with a complimentary smartphone and 1-year mobile plan. The intervention consists of nutrition and
fitness counseling provided over the phone by health
coaches (dieticians and fitness specialists). There is also a
web-based component, which provides participants with
optional e-mails for communicating with their health coaches and a goal-setting application introduced 6 months
into the program for recording daily activity and nutrition
behaviours. Health coaches have administrative access to
the web application in order to follow and comment on
each participant’s progress. The data collected is used to
inform health coaches in their practice and to evaluate the
web-application (patterns of use) and define participant
engagement in the program. There was an unexpected
delay in gaining ethics approval for this study, for there
were concerns regarding the web-based component and
potential risks for patient privacy. In addressing the
privacy issues raised by our research ethics board, we
strengthened our security measures and recognized the
importance of protecting patient privacy when implementing web-based applications for clinical research.
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Ethical standards and legislation regarding
patient privacy in Canada
In Ontario, Canada, all healthcare practices must adhere to
the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA), a
provincial law based on 10 privacy principles: 1) Accountability for personal health information (PHI); 2) Identifying
purposes for the collection of PHI; 3) Consent for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information (PI); 4)
Limiting collection of PHI; 5) Limiting use, disclosure, and
retention of personal information (PI); 6) Ensuring accuracy for PHI; 7) Ensuring safeguards for PI; 8) Openness
about PI policies and practices; 9) Individual access to own
PI; and 10) Challenging compliance with the hospital’s
privacy policies and practices [10]. All research involving
human subjects in Canada must adhere to the Tri-Council
Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving
Humans (TCPS2), a joint, federal policy of the Canadian
Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Natural Sciences
and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC),
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada (SSHRC) [11]. The policy’s section on Privacy
and Confidentiality states that researchers have an ethical
duty of confidentiality, safeguarding information entrusted
to them without misusing or wrongfully disclosing it [11].
The Smart Heart Trial underwent ethics review by two
organizations, London Health Sciences Centre (LHSC) and
Western University, ensuring the study met PHIPA,
TCPS2, as well as hospital policies and ethical standards.
Objectives
The objective of this paper is to provide a detailed overview of the challenges the Smart Heart Trial faced in
meeting the high standards of the research ethics board
(REB), specifically regarding patient privacy. We outline
our solutions, and describe their successes and limitations, in order to inform future similar studies and
model much needed transparency in ensuring high quality security and protection of patient privacy when using
web-based and mobile devices for telecommunication
and data collection in clinical research.
Addressing privacy issues for smart heart trial
Disclosure of information regarding Web application
security measures

The first REB request was a full description of the
web application and how it protected patient privacy.
Thus, we provided information on: 1) data type and
delivery, including study population, data storage locations, logging, and data retention; 2) privacy, including information security, access to information,
disclosure, and consent; and 3) security, including
hosting environment and authentication. This information
is summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1 Description of Web-Based Application for the Research
Ethics Board (REB)

Page 3 of 8

Table 1 Description of Web-Based Application for the Research
Ethics Board (REB) (Continued)

Section 1 - Data Type and Delivery
Study population

Obese patients (ages 7-17) with existing cardiac
condition

Data Storage
Locations

1. LHSC Shared Drive: Identifiable data is stored
only on the LHSC network on a private
shared storage location.
• Type of Data:
• Notes and documentation gathered from the
health coaches, demographic data, etc.
• Patient demographic data.
• Study related documentation.
• Database backups and Web access logs.
2. Web Server: Anonymized data is maintained
on ISQ Solutions Inc. web server. This data is
stored in SQL DB with user authentication via
a web interface or mobile phone app. All
information is entered under a generic patient
login name (e.g., ‘patient1’, ‘patient2’, etc) and
password.
• Type of Data:
• Numerical data related to the users’ exercise
and eating habits.
3. Email System: Data is also transferred via email
to and from patients, again using anonymized
generated patient ID. Information is transient
and is deleted as the trial data is analyzed.
• Type of Data:
• Follow-up from health coaches will be
transferred to and from patients.
4. External Drive: The identified data stored on
the LHSC network is backed up with the
standard LHSC backup utility, and copied
to an external encrypted HD that is stored
on site at LHSC in a locked cabinet,
compatible with hospital records-keeping
standards.
• Type of Data:
• Notes and documentation gathered from the
health coaches.
• Patient demographic data.
• Study related documentation.

Logging

• The phone and email communication will be
logged on pen-and-paper forms by the
health coaches as it is acquired.
• Access to the web site and database will be
logged to an activity log and stored on the
web server. This log is backed up nightly
to the LHSC server shared area.

Data Retention

• All study data will be maintained five years
after the study has been completed, as per
hospital protocol.

Section 2: Privacy
• Only information stored on the LHSC network contains patient
identifiable information. All other information is entered under
a generic ID with password.
Information Security

• External access to data:
• Anonymized information is stored on an
external web server. Web server requires
ID and password for access.
• Email communication to and from health
coach. Emails are stored on external email
server. Anonymized accounts are used,
and no patient identifiable information
is transferred. ID and password are
required for access.

• External access to the shared drive on LHSC
server is accessible to team members only
via Juniper VPN, utilizing 2 form authentication.
• External data backup drive:
• Kept onsite at hospital, stored in a locked
drawer, and encrypted with 512-bit encryption
and 64 character password. Trucrypt is used
to encrypt the drive.
• System Tracking, backup and logging:
• Web site access is tracked and logged.
• Email access is logged.
• Website, database, all log files are backed
up nightly.
• Shared Drive is backed up nightly and
archived to encrypted external drive.
Access to Information • Role-based access
• Access rights (e.g., read only, read/modify)
to web site, shared drive, and e-mail account
is controlled depending on type of user
(physician, health coach, participant, vendor/
ISQ Solutions. Inc, technical support staff)
Disclosure

• No personal health information will be
disclosed to any persons who are not
employees or agents of the hospital.

Consent

• Patient/SDM consent is being obtained
for the collection, use and/or disclosure
of the information for the study.

Section 3: Security
Hosting and
Environment

• LHSC Shared Drive is stored on a server in
the LHSC Data Centre.
• Web Server is hosted by ISQ Solution Inc.
o Windows2008 server
o SQL2008 Database.
o IIS 7
o Backend access is via sftp or https.
• Email Server is hosted by ISQ Solution Inc.
o Windows2008 server
o Web Mail
• Secure web mail client available. (https)

Authentication

• All access requires an ID and password.
• No information is stored on the phone or
workstation.
• All data accessible via email or web server
and has no patient identifiers.
• System access is logged.

Despite these safeguards (Table 1), the REB required
further information which caused a delay in the initiation of the study, due to a number of special issues
associated with the use of web-based services to gather
the anonymized data. We recognized the severity of the
following issues raised by the committee, and accordingly, we prepared the following response to the specific
items raised by the REB. As such, this information may
prove valuable in assisting other researchers with navigating policies of their own REB.
Ontario’s “PHIPA” privacy laws are based on 10 privacy
principles. Of these principles 1 to 4 pertain to the “Accountability, Collection, Consent, and Constraints and
Limits” on data collection. These are addressed through
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non-technical means, through the protocols of the study
and the interactions with participants, as governed by
the Research and Ethics Protocol of our study; these
are general administrative principles. Similarly, principles 5, 6, 8 and 10 regard policies that limit the use
and restrict disclosure of records, as well as ensuring
accuracy and openness of these policies. Principle 9 deals
with “individual access” to records. Since our patients
enter their own data, and no other information is stored,
they have first-hand knowledge of this information. No
mechanism is provided to enable participants to directly
access the recorded information once it is entered. However, participants are able to access to their own data in
order to review their progress, as part of the experimental
protocol, by contacting the Study Consultant. What remains to be addressed is principle 7, which deals with
“Ensuring Safeguards” for participants PI, and is the focus
of the remainder of our report.
Addressing the general vulnerability of Web-based services

We were asked by the REB to address a number of generic
concerns regarding the general security of web services.
This is not an unreasonable request; yet many of the REB’s
concerns were couched in technical terms such as
‘minimization of attack surface’ and other web security idioms. The techniques we utilized for re-deploying our web
application prototype intrinsically allowed for a rich layer
of security. To be sure, most IT teams, even the ones who
actively engage in threat modeling, do not understand
their web application’s attack surface. From an architectural standpoint, it is typical for such teams to brainstorm
with a whiteboard, and create a high-level diagram of all
the major components and how they interact. From the
source code perspective, you can examine the dependencies between files and what database permissions are
needed. One can even point to the encryption scheme
used by our internet services provider. For complex systems, this exercise can provide a complete picture of the
processes, data flows, protocols, privilege boundaries,
external entities, and so on, which would provide you with
an understanding all of the potential attack vectors. However, in our particular case, the interactions were not
complex and quite straightforward, without interactions
between service-oriented modules.
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To address these security concerns we employed a
defence strategy using coordinated protective layers in
combination with arranging the defence components in
ways that are complementary and co-supportive. This is
exactly the sense in which it is used for security and
safety precautions – to concede that no single defence
can be perfectly reliable. Typically, this involves using
multiple passwords, anti-virus software, secure server
technology and internet firewalls. We employ these and
make use of Logging and Sandboxing – the recording of
all interactions, and ensuring that no general “shell
script” functions are enabled along with the data records, respectively. From that top-level perspective, we
describe our approach to defence and security.
Minimization of the attack surface

It used to be that web application security considerations were restricted to concerns over the number of
ports that would be open on a server. Modern operating
systems have fully specified firewall rules implemented.
In the creation of our SQL database, we do not allow
other web services to access this database. We make use
of the secure Entity Framework to display data from the
single table on a page when requested by the authorized
administrator of the project; and this is handled by the
Microsoft secure framework and the Model, View,
Controller (MVC) software pattern (Fig. 1).
Use of defense in depth

Web Service developers typically make use of pre-existing
service libraries; following the installation instructions to
define and map two servlets into the web.xml file, and
then to integrate with the web app. After a bit of educated
trial and error, it may become functional. This is where
most developers stop. Unseasoned developers might need
to make use of a web “action” parameter which can be
function-typed as either “view”, “edit”, or “delete”; and
what if their application only uses “view”? They would still
be exposing the other actions for probing by anybody who
knows the URL syntax for that API. In our development,
we have considered the critical question: “How much
functionality do we actually need?”. Our application makes
straightforward use of HTTP get and post with validation
methods. We have provided full implementations of the

Fig. 1 Separation of Model, View, and Controller (MVC) for web-based systems. MVC is a pattern for developing applications that contains: Models
which represent the data of the application, Views which are visualize representations of the data, such as dynamically generated HTML responses,
and Controllers that connect the two by functioning to handle incoming browser requests, retrieve model data and return responses to the browser
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API methods for forms posting and database queries, thus
eliminating these attack modes. We make use of input
validation when the forms are posted, and we have full
access to our website files at all times, addressing the final
question on fixing code directly (Fig. 2).
“Defence in Depth” is the old military strategy of arranging protective layers in a coordinated fashion – the goal
is to slow the advance of the enemy, rather than to
suppose that one fail-safe line can ever be established as
an absolute wall to the attack. Secure systems need to be
developed according to the principle that each application layer and sub-system is responsible for its own
security. Each level should function as its own gatekeeper and act as if it is always interacting directly with
the outside world, authenticating and authorizing users
before allowing them to perform any actions. Our design
employs this methodology through the use of web
authentication, which utilizes anti-forgery tokens for
each transaction between client and server.

Use of least privileges

Our Web Application handles input requests from the
users by executing them with the least amount of privilege. We have designed our application not to require
elevated rights and avoid scenarios that require them.
When required, they would be temporary and restricted
by granting them for only the minimum time required
to complete the task followed by immediate removal.
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There is also no disk access, and consequently, files
cannot be deleted, uploaded or executed.
Employment of secure defaults

Starting with version 1.1, ASP.NET has built-in input
filtering for implementation of secure defaults. Any
attempt to submit a request containing bracketed tags
(“<“or”>”) in any of its form data, query string parameters, or cookies, results in an error page indicating that
malicious input has been detected. This, in addition to
our server-side validation, prevents malicious attack
through the HTTP request. We also make use of SQL
Membership, which is a “secure default” implementation
for the Database Access side.
Assumption that the external systems are insecure

On a web-based system, any input from a user’s browser,
or another system, should always be treated as a potential threat. Our design imposes validation for each and
every interaction processed by the Web Application. We
never assume that we can trust the HTML request simply because it has already been validated elsewhere. For
example, when a user types an entry into a web form,
the client-side code (e.g. Javascript) can validate the data
to ensure it complies with the range of acceptable values.
This may help to create a more robust user experience,
but this is certainly not our only line of defence. It is
very easy for a would-be attacker to submit a form post
directly to the server, thus bypassing any client-side

Fig. 2 Breakdown of functions and message passing in classical MVC. This figure describes some of the basic functions of each of the three
components of the classical MVC pattern. Separating these roles into three separate components makes the system easier to develop, test,
maintain and update. All of which enhances the security of the application and system
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validation. Therefore, our design employs server-side verification. We make use of controller-based procedures to
validate the data, thus blocking the use of web-based
attacks that circumvent the client-side validation. For web
maintenance and development, our server provides a
secure connection between a users’ computer and their
services that protects e-mail, data, and uploads. In order
to establish connections, they make use of a secure socket
layer (SSL) (see Additional file 1).

Successes, limitations, and lessons learned
The Smart Heart Trial was approved in June 2012 by delegated review of the Clinical Research Impact Committee
of the LHSC and Western University (REB #18843).
Avancha et al. identified misuse of patient identities,
unauthorized access to PI, and unauthorized disclosure
of PI as potential threats to user privacy; and suggests
authentication, anonymity, consent, and access control
as security measures against these threats [7]. The Smart
Heart Trial’s web-based application employs these protective measures. For example, in one hypothetical scenario an outsider gains access to de-identified data and
can then re-identify patients from anonymized research
data. In the Smart Heart Trial, de-identified data is only
stored on the hospital network in a private shared storage site. Access to the shared drive is secured by controlling user access rights and individual passwords,
which must meet up to 3 requirements (e.g., one upper
case letter) for added password complexity. There is also
a virtual private network (VPN) available to the project
researchers for data access, but user rights access and
password controls follow the same stringent rule set.
Thus, the chances of an outsider obtaining de-identified
data are very slim. A breach of privacy would require
auditing of group membership. Anonymized data is
stored on a secure, external web server hosted by ISQ
Solutions, Inc., and only contains numerical data that
would be meaningless without the knowledge of the
health coaches and physicians associated with the study.
Patients are assigned generated usernames (e.g., patient
1, patient 2) and passwords for logging in to the web
application. They cannot view previously submitted data.
Thus, even if an outsider obtained the correct patient
login information, they cannot access anonymized or deidentified information, as no information is stored on
the phone or workstation. Informed consent regarding
privacy policy and the collection, use and/or disclosure
of information for the study was obtained from patients
or parents/guardians of minor participants. As part of
the recruitment process, and prior to consent, participants or their parents/guardians were verbally informed
of the inherent risks associated with electronic PHI data
storage and our obligations to maintain their privacy.
The study also employed role-based access restricting
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access to only legitimate personnel and minimizing the
possibility for intentional or accidental modification of
PI [7]. For example, in the Smart Heart Trial, participants are granted “read only” rights to the web application, and no rights to access the hospital shared drive.
A limitation of the Smart Heart Trial’s web application
is that a user has unlimited tries to log in to the web
application. However, the user is not informed whether
their error is in the username or password, rendering
automatic username/password generators ineffective.
Furthermore, there were “trade-offs” between web application functionality and security—the more complex the
application, the greater the security risks. Initially, we
wanted to implement a complex feedback system between participants and health coaches where participants can view their progress to date. However, allowing
patients to view their previous data entries may mean
increased potential for unauthorized outsiders to also
access this data. Time constraints also influenced the
nature and quality of the security system. For example,
we chose a third-party web server provider, for it would
have taken approximately 8 months to implement the
application on the hospital server. Additionally, the web
application received approval much later than other
components of the study intervention. Thus, we began
our study without the web-based application and decided all participants should enroll in it in the second
half of the intervention timeline. This approach has two
advantages: 1) all participants will receive the same
intervention and 2) we will be able to evaluate if adding
the web-based application enhances the compliance of
participants and study outcomes. Future studies
should consider these factors (time and “trade-offs”)
when designing web-based applications, being prepared to
make sacrifices on application functionality or adapt to
changes in timelines during implementation.

Discussion
Advances in information technology open up a new
realm of possibilities for health services and clinical
research using web-based applications and mobile
devices. Healthcare practitioners and researchers must
not neglect their ethical duty to protect patient privacy
in their pursuit of developing and implementing the next
innovative health technology. This paper discusses, and
offers some solutions to, the challenges of protecting
patient privacy by outlining the security solutions to a
web-based, mobile lifestyle intervention for obese children and adolescents with CHD, and their strengths and
weaknesses against threats such as misuse of patient
identities and unauthorized access to PI.
In reporting our process, we demonstrate dedication to
our ethical duty to protect patient privacy. This transparency and reporting of data security in clinical research can
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help keep researchers accountable, while also sharing
strategies on how to address security and privacy issues.
For example, Stopczynski et al. recommends openness
amongst researchers collecting data using sensor networks
so that new security platforms do not have to be created
for every new study [12]. Even in the private sector,
Albrecht et al. calls for a standard reporting mechanisms
for medical smartphone applications, especially those
regarding security, to foster transparency and help users
make informed choices [13]. Similarly, we call upon clinical researchers to report on data security when publishing
research on web-based and mobile health technology.
Each health intervention is unique as they differ in their
purpose, target population, and methods for patient engagement. Thus, the security challenges will be unique.
For example, in the Smart Heart Trial, there is no text
message component, and consequently, no additional security risks. In contrast, Branson et al. sent text message
reminders for appointments to adolescent outpatients,
and employed an abbreviation technique (e.g., “C u Wed
at 8”) to protect patient confidentiality. As solutions to
unique security challenges are shared and reported,
perhaps security and privacy developments will adapt in
parallel to the proliferation of web-based, mobile technology in healthcare, capturing both ethical merit and
innovation in the future of health technology.
Of course, it is still an open controversy as to what
extent the PHI is placed at risk using electronic records.
The interested reader can read more about the objective
measures of risk in (Weston [14]) and more recent
reports by the Ontario Director of Health Policy for a
Canadian perspective (Grant and Di Re [15]). There will
always be some level of risk associated with electronic
record keeping, but properly implementing currently
available technologies and defence strategies will minimize
this risk to an acceptable level.
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